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Touchdown for the Union: Why the NFL Needs
an Instant Replay in Williams v. NFL
Jaime Koziol*
I. INTRODUCTION
Football holds a unique place in American culture. The 2010 Super
Bowl was the top-rated telecast in history, with over 106 million view-
ers tuning in to see the New Orleans Saints beat the Indianapolis
Colts.' However, not many of the those viewers know the inner-
workings and behind-the-scenes dealings that take place between the
National Football League ("NFL") and the professional football play-
ers. It is precisely these dealings - the ones that allow for fun Sunday
afternoons and thrilling Monday nights - that the Eighth Circuit has
interpreted in a troublesome way, resulting in an unequal playing field
between NFL teams.
The entire 2009-10 NFL season was largely impacted by two teams:
the New Orleans Saints and the Minnesota Vikings. It is unlikely that
either team would have been as successful if they had lost any premier
players for the first four weeks of the season. However, Saints defen-
sive ends Will Smith and Charles Grant, Saints running back Deuce
McAllister, and Vikings defensive tackles Pat Williams and Kevin Wil-
liams were all supposed to serve four-game suspensions after testing
positive for a banned diuretic in December 2008; the suspensions have
not been served. Instead, Smith had a career-high thirteen sacks,
Grant and McAllister led their team to a Super Bowl title, and both
Pat and Kevin Williams helped the Vikings make the playoffs. The
drawn-out legal battle over the suspensions paid off for the two teams,
but has ultimately left the NFL as a loser.
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The five respective Vikings and Saints players tested positive for
bumetanide, a diuretic contained in StarCaps,2 which is banned by the
NFL because it can be used to mask the presence of steroids. In re-
sponse to their positive test, the players were each suspended for four
games in an arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the NFL's anti-doping
policy ("Policy"). 3 How this punishment was enforced is a different
story. Here, the five players, who all violated the same provision of
the Policy,4 received different punishments. The NFL now faces a se-
rious problem of inequity, since the Saints players will be suspended
for four games, 5 while the Vikings players might not be suspended at
all because of Minnesota state law.
The Eighth Circuit dealt a blow to the NFL's drug-testing Policy by
holding that the NFL's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with
the NFL Players Association ("the Union") did not prevent the Min-
nesota players from challenging the NFL's drug-testing regime under
Minnesota state laws. Williams v. NFL6 muddies the water about the
relationship between state statutory drug testing laws and the policies
contained and bargained for in CBAs between employers and employ-
ees. The Eighth Circuit decision that Minnesota laws were not pre-
empted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA") 7 threatens the competitive balance by which the NFL is
2. Millard Baker, Diuretic Bumetanide Used by NFL Players to Mask Anabolic Steroid Use?,
STEROID REPORT (Oct. 26, 2008, 9:52 AM), http://www.steroidreport.com/2008/10/26fbumeta-
nide-used-by-nfl-players-to-mask-anabolic-steroid-use/ (StarCaps by Balanced Health Products
is a dietary supplement marketed for weight loss that contains bumetanide).
3. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND
THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, art. XLIV § 6(b) (2009), available at http://www.docstoc.com/
docs/20343876/NFL-CoUective-Bargaining-Agreement-2006-2012.
4. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (the Policy bans NFL players from using
a number of Prohibited Substances including blocking or masking agents, such as diuretics or
water pills, which have been used in the past by some players to reach an assigned weight. The
Policy adopts a rule of strict liability under which players are responsible for what is in their
bodies and explains that a positive test result will not be excused because a player was unaware
he was taking a prohibited substance.).
5. The state of Louisiana has a statute that regulates workplace drug testing that is very simi-
lar to Minnesota. The Louisiana statute, however, provides for an exemption for the NFL. As a
result, the three players from the New Orleans Saints are eligible to serve their four-game sus-
pension imposed by the NFL pursuant to league policy.
6. 582 F.3d at 873.
7. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). The LMRA protects
the rights of workers to unionize and establishes a national policy, favoring arbitration, rather
than litigation, to resolve disputes between labor and management. Section 301, is by its terms,
simply a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to adjudicate challenges to arbitrators' rulings
and other questions, but the Supreme Court has long construed Section 301 as also having sub-
stantive effect: It preempts lawsuits based on state law that either rely directly on a CBA or
indirectly require the interpretation of a CBA. See Michael C. Dorf, Football and Federalism: A
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characterized, and - on a larger scale - strips employers of their
power to collectively bargain with employees.
This Note uses precedent, theories, and policy to argue that the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Williams should be reversed. Part II of
this Note explores the federal preemption doctrine, and the back-
ground of the doctrine in terms of case law and legislative intent.8
Part III will discuss the Williams opinion.9 Part IV will argue that
preemption of Section 301 of the LMRA was compelled by applicable
Supreme Court authority and is especially appropriate in the Williams
case. 10 Moreover, Part IV argues that the Eighth Circuit's opinion
will leave professional sports leagues subject to a patchwork of dispa-
rate state laws and regulations, specifically jeopardizing the integrity
of professional sports' uniform drug testing programs." Part V then
elaborates on the devastating implications that the Eighth Circuit de-
cision will have on collective bargaining in the general Union setting
and the effects that undermining CBAs will have on professional
sports. 12 Part VI proposes and explores several solutions.13 Lastly, in
Part VII, this Note concludes that because of the ramifications of the
decision, the Eighth Circuit's holding should be reversed.' 4 Further,
in order to prevent players from using state laws to challenge drug
suspensions, the Supreme Court should hold that the NFL's drug poli-
cies trump state law. 15
II. BACKGROUND
For over fifty years, courts have interpreted Section 301 of the
LMRA, the federal preemption doctrine, and proffered different tests
to determine when state laws are trumped by federal law Section 301.
These principles made their way to the forefront of the debate in Wil-
liams.16 This part first discusses Section 301, then traces various
precedents and considers legislative intent when examining the Sec-
tion 301 doctrine. This section will then discuss Section 301 in the
professional sports arena and explain the importance of both uniform
Case Centers on NFL Drug Testing, FINDLAW (Sept. 23,2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20090923.html.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part VII.
15. See infra Part VII.
16. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009).
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anti-doping codes. Finally, it will stress the importance of judicial def-
erence to arbitration decisions.
A. Supreme Court Interpretation of Section 301
The Eighth Circuit in Williams17 held that Section 301 of the LMRA
did not preempt Minnesota state laws. 18 Section 301 of the LMRA
states that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties."' 19 In other words, this doctrine applies to suits for breaches
of CBAs,20 including the CBA entered into between the Union2l and
the National Football League Management Council ("NFLMC") that
is at issue in Williams.22 The Supreme Court has recognized that, in
enacting Section 301, Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law
to uniformly prevail over inconsistent state rules.23
The subject matter of Section 301 demands uniform judicial applica-
tion of the law.24 The Supreme Court explained that:
[Tihe possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a dis-
ruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of
collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the
rights which it obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the ne-
cessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to
17. Id. at 868.
18. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
19. Id.
20. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (interpret-
ing the language of Section 301 to mean that federal courts are authorized by Congress to create
a body of federal common law for the enforcement and resolution of dispute arising out of
CBAs).
21. The National Football League Players Association, or NFLPA, is the labor union of play-
ers in the National Football League. It was founded in 1956, and it achieved recognition as a
collective bargaining unit in 1968. About Us, NFL PLAYERS, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-
us/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
22. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868 (on March 8, 2006, the National Football League Management
Council (NFLMC), which is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the member clubs, and
the Union entered into the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012).
23. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (holding that a suit in state court
alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and resolved
by reference to federal law. Therefore, a state law that purports to define the meaning or scope
of a term in a contract suit is preempted by federal labor law.).
24. Id. at 103-04 (explaining why the meaning given to terms in collective-bargaining agree-
ments must be determined by federal law).
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contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which
might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract.
25
The Supreme Court articulated a test for Section 301 preemption in
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,26 the leading case in the area of fed-
eral preemption.27 There, an employee brought a state tort action
against his employer and insurer, alleging bad faith handling of his
disability insurance claim, even though the CBA incorporated the self-
funded disability plan and established a grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure.28 The Supreme Court held that the state-law right was
grounded in the CBA and was therefore preempted.29 The case ar-
ticulated a new test for Section 301 preemption: the analysis must fo-
cus on whether a state claim "is inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract ... and when resolu-
tion of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement . . . that claim must [ ] be treated as a Sec-
tion 301 claim."' 30 A variation of this test would be used almost
twenty-five years later in Williams.31
In the most recent Supreme Court case regarding Section 301 pre-
emption, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,32 the Court
expanded on the test laid out by Justice Blackmun in Lueck by pre-
empting all state law claims that are dependent upon analysis of a
CBA. 33 The basic theory is that the "application of state law.., might
lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law
principles as there are States."'34 Justice Stevens determined in Lingle
that the uniform interpretation of CBAs promotes the peaceable, con-
sistent resolution of labor-management disputes. 35
25. Id.
26. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
27. Madison C. Jellins, Section 301 and Random Drug Testing by Employers: Are California
State Constitutional Claims Preempted?, 23 U.S.F. L. REv. 221, 227 (1989).
28. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 204.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id.
31. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009).
32. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 406 (1988).
33. Id. at 406 (holding that a plaintiff's state-law claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a
workers' compensation claim against her employer is not preempted, as it did not require inter-
pretation of the CBA because the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation
claim is recognized by state law).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 404 (emphasizing that the primary rationale for Section 301 is to ensure the uniform
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements).
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B. Section 301 in the Professional Sports Arena
Federal preemption has historically been a formidable hurdle for
the NFL to tackle in defending itself against state tort claims brought
by its member athletes.36 The scope of the preemption doctrine in the
context of major professional sports was addressed in Stringer v.
NFL.37 There, a Minnesota Vikings player died of heatstroke at sum-
mer training camp. 38 Subsequently, his widow brought a wrongful
death/survivorship action and class action complaint for injunctive re-
lief against the NFL.39 According to the widow, the NFL breached its
duty to NFL players by failing "to use ordinary care in overseeing,
controlling, and regulating practices, policies, procedures, equipment,
working conditions and culture of the NFL teams, including the Vik-
ings, to minimize the risk of heat-related illness."'40 The NFL argued
that the widow's claim should be dismissed, because it was preempted
by Section 301 of the LMRA.41 The federal district court, using a sim-
ilar analysis that the Eighth Circuit now adopts,42 held that the wrong-
ful death claim against the NFL was preempted because its resolution
required interpretation of the terms of the CBA.43
In so holding, the district court articulated a two-part test to deter-
mine whether a state-law tort claim is sufficiently independent to sur-
vive the Section 301 preemption. 44 First, "[a] court must ascertain
whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the CBA or by
state law."'45 This requires a court to look at how the claim came into
being; meaning, "is the CBA the source of the duty allegedly vio-
lated?" 46 If that question is answered affirmatively, the claim will be
preempted by Section 301. 47 If the plaintiff's claim is not grounded in
the terms of the CBA, the court will determine "whether proof of the
state law claim requires interpretation of CBA terms. '48 The court
36. Timothy Davis, Tort Liability of Coaches For Injuries to Professional Athletes: Overcoming
Policy and Doctrinal Barriers, 76 UMKC L. REV. 571, 588 (2008).
37. Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
38. Id. at 898.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 899.
41. Id.
42. See Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a state
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the LMRA, because
consideration of the claim did not require review of the CBA).
43. Stringer, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
44. Id. at 900.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 904.
47. Id. at 903.
48. Stringer, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
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will look to see if resolution of the state law claim is substantially de-
pendent upon or inextricably intertwined with an analysis of the CBA.
If so, the claim will be preempted.4 9
In the past, the Eighth Circuit has provided guidance on federal
preemption, and has applied a similar analysis to Stringer in order to
determine if a claim is sufficiently "independent" to survive Section
301 preemption. 50 First, a state-law claim is preempted if it is based
on a provision of the CBA, meaning that the CBA provision at issue
actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is based.51 Second, a
state-law claim is preempted where the claim is dependent upon an
analysis of the relevant CBA, meaning that the plaintiff's state-law
claim requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA. 52 The court
in Williams applied this test to hold that the state law claims are not
dependent on analysis of the CBA, and thus are not preempted by
Section 301. 53
The NFL has been a defendant in another preeminent case, Holmes
v. NFL,54 which illustrates how Section 301 often prevents athletes
from succeeding on state law claims. In Holmes, an athlete tested pos-
itive to a drug test given by his team, the Detroit Lions, pursuant to
the NFL's drug-testing program.5 5 That program was established
under the NFL CBA.56 After the positive drug test, the athlete invol-
untarily enrolled in the NFL's drug program and was suspended from
four games without pay. Then, he brought suit alleging that the im-
posed punishment mandated by the NFL CBA violated his due pro-
cess rights.57 The court held that the underlying labor dispute
concerning the propriety of Holmes's enrollment in the drug program
49. Id.
50. Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009).
54. Holmes v. NFL, 939 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
55. Id. at 520.
56. Id. The NFL's Drug Program was adopted as part of the collective bargaining process
between the Management Council and the NFLPA. The Drug Program is a three-stage program
designed to treat and/or discipline players with substance abuse problems. Stage 1 involves a
preliminary medical evaluation and, if necessary, treatment for players who enter the program
through a positive drug test. A player who is referred to Stage 1 by reason of a positive drug test
advances to Stage 2, where he becomes subject to unannounced drug testing conducted by the
program's Medical Advisor. A player who tests positive for drugs while in Stage 2 is subject to
discipline that includes a fine of four weeks' regular season pay. A player who tests positive a
second time during Stage 2 faces a four-game suspension without pay, and advances to Stage 3.
A positive drug test in Stage 3 results in banishment from the NFL for a period of at least one
calendar year.
57. Id.
20101
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could not be separated from his state tort and contract claims, and
thus the claims were preempted by the LMRA. 58
As Stringer and Holmes illustrate, athletes typically have a difficult
time asserting state claims against their respective teams and the NFL.
Athletes pursuing claims against professional teams and programs
have not fared well in the instances in which courts have examined the
applicability of preemption to claims premised on state law.59 This
background set the stage for the Williams decision. This article will
explain how the Eighth Circuit applied the appropriate test in a new
way, straying from years of precedent, resulting in a shocking and
harmful result to the NFL and employers.
C. The Importance of Uniform Anti-Doping Codes
It is imperative to address the importance of uniform anti-doping
codes before critiquing the Williams decision. In Williams, the Union
entered into a CBA with the NFLMC that expressly incorporated the
Policy on anabolic steroids and related substances. 60 This Policy is
similar to other anti-doping codes in that both operate in such a way
to require nationwide enforcement and uniformity.61 Doping is pro-
hibited in part because it is believed that certain drugs allow players
and athletes to have an unfair competitive advantage over other non-
doping athletes.62 In an effort to promote a level playing field, with
some exceptions, players must abide by the rules to play.
58. Holmes, 939 F. Supp. at 527.
59. Davis, supra note 36, at 588.
60. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2009) (the CBA provides that "all players,
Clubs, the Union, and the NFL and the NFLMC will be bound hereby .... " The Policy is
conducted under the auspices of the NFLMC. It bans NFL players from using a number of
Prohibited Substances including blocking or masking agents, such as diuretics or water pills,
which have been used in the past by some players to reach an assigned weight. The policy adopts
a rule of strict liability under which players are responsible for what is in their bodies and ex-
plains that a positive test result will not be excused because a player was unaware he was taking
a prohibited substance.).
61. See UNITED STATEs ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/about (last visited Sept.
29, 2010). The United States Anti-Doping Agency administers the anti-doping code for the
Olympics. The USADA and NFL policy both prohibit the diuretic Bumetanide and impose
periods of ineligibility based on the principle that an athlete is personally responsible for a pro-
hibited substance found in his or her system.
62. The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports' Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal Crossroads: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [here-
inafter Standen] (testimony of Jeffrey Standen, Professor of Law, Willamette University)
(arguing that Williams was wrongfully decided and that Congress must act to ensure that profes-
sional sports leagues are able to maintain their paramount goals, competitive balance, and com-
petitive integrity).
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While some competitive advantages are inevitable, such as the
"home-field advantage," 63 where a team benefits by playing at its own
stadium, professional sports leagues attempt to eliminate other local
advantages directly.64 In addition to the anti-doping Policy, the NFL
imposes a total cap or limit on teams' salaries in order to preclude a
single team from hiring all of the best players, requires each team in
the same division to play an identical slate of opponents from another
division, and demands league-wide revenue sharing from broadcasts. 65
These restrictions, along with the NFL's anti-doping Policy, help en-
sure a level playing field.
There are several purposes of anti-doping codes in professional
sports: (1) to maintain a level playing field for the athletes; (2) to pro-
tect the athletes' health; and (3) to preserve the spirit of sport.66 The
main purpose, however, is to remove the unfair advantage and uneven
playing field that can be caused by non-uniform rules regarding drug
use in sports.67 The World-Anti Doping Code, administered by the
United States Anti-Doping Code Agency ("USADA") for Olympic
athletes, accomplishes uniformity, and thus creates a level playing
field for elite athletes.68 Further, the Code instructs that anti-doping
rules should not be subject to state employment laws because "these
sport-specific rules and procedures ... are distinct in nature from and
are, therefore, not intended to be subject to or limited by any national
requirements and legal standards applicable to ... employment mat-
ters .... [A]II Courts should be aware and respect the distinct nature
of anti-doping rules."' 69 The anti-doping Policy in Williams70 is strik-
ingly similar to the World-Anti Doping Code, and thus, should be ap-
plied and respected in the same manner.
The USADA is not alone in recognizing that the sports context calls
for special consideration. Appellate courts have recognized the criti-
cal need for uniformity in determining athlete eligibility.71 In the past,
63. Home field advantage is enhanced by fan support, familiarity with the field and its sur-
roundings, and the lack of required travel. Football, ABOUT.COM, http://football.about.com/cs/
footballlOl/glgLhomefieldadv.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
64. Standen, supra note 62, at 7-8.
65. Standen, supra note 62, at 8.
66. World Anti-Doping Code, WORLD Arm-DoPINo AGENCY (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.wad
aama.org/rtecontent/document/codev2009_en.pdf.
67. Id. (the purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-doping effort through universal harmo-
nization of core anti-doping elements).
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009).
71. See Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc., 608 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (holding that it would be inappropriate to attribute different unique meanings to [the
2010]
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the Seventh Circuit emphasized the need for uniformity in such deci-
sions by noting "there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal
courts for determining the eligibility or procedures for determining
the eligibility of athletes. '72 Further, the Seventh Circuit noted that
several other courts have recognized the implication of allowing indi-
vidual athletes to sue professional sports leagues. "[T]o hold a com-
mon law duty exists outside the scope of the [LMRA], thereby
enabling an individual athlete to bring suit, threatens to override legis-
lative intent and opens the door to inconsistent interpretations of the
[LMRA]."73
Additionally, a long history of legislative intent and congressional
discouragement illustrates the need for uniform administration of
anti-doping codes. Congressional hearings involving athletes and the
use of performance-enhancing drugs can be traced back to the 101st
Congress.74 The United States Sentencing Commission Steroid Re-
port of 2006 declares, "[c]ongressional concern is not just about ster-
oid misuse by major league professionals but also the trickledown
effects that such use has on amateur athletes, notably teenagers. '75
Thus, decisions that appear to accept the use of steroids by athletes,
like Williams, not only affect the integrity of the game, but have the
far-reaching effect of setting a bad example for athletes of all ages, at
all levels of competition.
Congress acknowledges this negative impact. As far back as 1988,
Congress has focused intensely on the issue of performance-enhancing
drugs in professional sports leagues. The Senate Judiciary Committee
conducted hearings called "Steroids in Amateur and Professional
Sports: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Use."'76 During these
Amateur Sports Act's] provisions in New Jersey and thus create a jurisdictional sanctuary from
the Congressional determination that these types of disputes should be resolved outside of judi-
cial processes).
72. Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 594 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Amateur Sports Act preempted state law claims, because the athlete, whose urine test had indi-
cated a possible blood doping violation, was challenging the methods for determining eligibility
of athletes, which is a matter that could not be resolved without opening up the doors to incon-
sistent interpretations of the Act) (quoting J. Posner's concurring opinion in Michels v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984)).
73. Id. at 595. See also Walton-Floyd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (noting that the interest of maintaining consistent interpretations among jurisdictions
requires the LMRA to preempt claims asserted under state tort law).
74. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Use:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989).
75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N: 2006 STEROID REPORT (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.
ussc.govlUSSCsteroidsreport-0306.pdf.
76. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Use:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989).
[Vol. 9:137
TouCHDOWN FOR THE UNION
hearings, witnesses testified about the rampant use of steroids in the
NFL.77 In more recent hearings, Representative Henry A. Waxman
noted in his opening remarks the significance of the federal govern-
ment's involvement in the issue of prohibiting performance enhancing
drugs in sports. "[T]oday's hearing is about steroid use ... and the
implications for Federal policy.... [T]he most important [thing] Con-
gress can do [is to] do our part to change the culture of steroids that
has become a part of baseball and too many other sports. '78
After the Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA")
and the National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA") amended
their drug testing program in 2005, then-Senator (and now Vice Presi-
dent) Joseph Biden stated: "[T]he collective bargaining process
worked. . . . [T]his is a great day for baseball. ' 79 More recently,
Biden commented that "steroids and performance enhancing drugs
not only pose a great health risk, but they threaten the fundamental
integrity of sports. '80 Congress has left no doubt that the use of per-
formance enhancing drugs by players in the professional sports arena
is an issue of significant magnitude and one that requires a league-
wide uniform resolution. Congress would not have focused on the use
of performance-enhancing drugs so extensively in professional sports
leagues had it expected that state regulation would undermine the
uniform league-wide anti-doping programs.
D. Mandatory Arbitration to Enforce Professional Sports'
Anti-Doping Programs
Finally, it is critical to discuss the role that arbitration plays in the
enforcement of anti-doping programs, because the Eighth Circuit in
Williams chose to not enforce the arbitrator's punishment.81 As a
general matter, courts stay on the sidelines during labor negotiations
and disputes and show judicial deference to arbitral decisions. The
CBAs for all professional team sports leagues provide arbitration pro-
cedures for resolving disputes between players and teams that relate
77. See id. at 109, 217 (during these hearings, the Senate invited numerous professional ath-
letes and coaches to testify at the time, including Marty Schottenheimer, Joe Patemo and Chuck
Knoll).
78. Restoring Faith In America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Erad-
icate Steroid Use, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) (statement of Rep. Waxman), available at http://www.
diamondfans.com/archive/househearing-109-8-steroids.pdf.
79. Michael O'Keeffe & T.J. Quinn, It's 3 Strikes and Yer Out!, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16,
2005.
80. Press Release, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Senate's Approval of the International Convention
Against Doping in Sport (July 22, 2008) (on file with author).
81. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 875 (8th Cir. 2009).
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to the provisions of the CBAs, the standard player/team contracts, and
league constitutions and bylaws. 82 Historically, courts have deferred
to arbitration decisions rendered in response to compliance with the
sport's anti-doping program. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
guided courts in respecting arbitration decisions.
A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance
procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness,
as well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law
under § 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the re-
sponsibility to interpret the labor contract in the first instance.83
Uniform administration of rules through a mandatory arbitration
process, just like uniform language of the rules themselves, creates a
level playing field for the players. Arbitration is the exclusive mecha-
nism for resolving such disputes.84 The NFL CBA provides:
Any dispute ... arising after the execution of this Agreement and
involving the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with,
any provision of this agreement, the NFL Player Contract, or any
applicable provision of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws pertaining
to terms and conditions of employment of NFL players, will be re-
solved exclusively in accordance with the procedure set forth in this
Article. 85
Courts also tend to avoid reviewing the reasonableness of arbitral
decisions. "[R]eview of an arbitration proceeding is narrowly limited.
A court will not disturb an award if it draws its essence from the CBA
and is not based on the arbitrator's own brand of industrial justice. '86
Where a CBA provides for an arbitration procedure for the resolution
of disputes over alleged contract violations, as is the case in Williams,
issues pertaining to the provisions of such agreements are not prop-
erly the province of state courts. Rather, they are the province of
arbitrators.87
There are several reasons why arbitrators are better suited than
courts to resolve issues pertaining to provisions of CBAs. First, arbi-
trators not only have specialized expertise with the language of the
applicable labor contract, but also with the customs and practices and
82. Davis, supra note 36, at 592.
83. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
84. Id. at 204 n.1.
85. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the NFL
Players Association, art. IX, § 1, at 13 (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
14066936/NFL-CBA-Amended-2006.pdf.
86. See Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.
1996) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
87. Id.
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traditions of the industry.88 Further, by sidestepping the available
grievance procedure, arbitration would lose its effectiveness 89 and
eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law under Section
301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to
interpret the labor contract in the first place.90 Finally, because arbi-
tration calls for a timely and final resolution, giving parties the ability
to rely on the finality of the decision, it is especially valuable in the
context of professional sports due to the limited number of years ath-
letes are able to play for. Thus, it is extremely important that courts
give proper deference to decisions made in the arbitration
proceedings.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: WILLIAMS V. NFL
The Eighth Circuit changed all this when it determined that in the
professional sports context, not all state law claims are preempted by
Section 301 of the LMRA. Section A of this Part discusses the facts of
Williams and the CBA that was entered into by the NFL and the
Union. Section B of this Part explains the Eighth Circuit's attempt to
resolve the tension between Section 301 of the LMRA and CBAs en-
tered into by professional sports leagues and athletes. Section C of
this Part considers the rationale and explanation for the holding by
specifically looking at the state law claims that were held not pre-
empted by Section 301.
A. Facts of Williams
On March 28, 2006, the NFLMC and the Union entered into the
NFL CBA 2006-2012.91 The CBA provided that all players, clubs, the
Union, the NFL and the NFLMC were bound by its provisions92 and
incorporated the Policy on anabolic steroids and related substances to
ban NFL players from using a number of "prohibit[ed] substance[s]
including blocking or masking agents" such as "diuretics or water
88. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 210; see also Oberkramer v. IBEW-NECA Serv. Ctr., Inc., 151 F.3d
752, 756 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that Section 301 preemption is necessary to preserve the central
role of arbitration in our system of industrial self-government); see also Vacca v. Viacom Broad.
of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1343 (noting that Section 301 preemption is designed to further a
policy aim set forth in Lueck-that of protecting and encouraging arbitration).
89. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219.
90. Id.
91. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009).
92. NFL PLAYERS Ass'N: NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS AND
RELATED SUBSTANCES, art. II § 1 (2008) [hereinafter Policy].
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pills. ' 93 The Policy adopts strict liability enforcement, under which
"players are responsible for what is in their bodies" and are not "ex-
cused because ... [he] was unaware he was taking a Prohibited Sub-
stance. ' 94 The Policy goes on to address the consequences of a
player's confirmed positive test result: "[T]he first time a player vio-
lates this policy by testing positive [for a banned substance] ... he will
be suspended without pay for a minimum of four regular and/or post-
season games." 95 Players who are subject to disciplinary action may
appeal to an arbitrator, whose decision "constitute[s] a full, final, and
complete disposition of the appeal" that is "binding on all parties. 96
In July and August 2008, five NFL football players - Kevin Williams
and Pat Williams of the Minnesota Vikings, and Charles Grant, Deuce
McAllister, and Will Smith of the New Orleans Saints - tested positive
for bumetanide, a prescription diuretic and masking agent, which is
banned by the NFL's Policy on anabolic steroids and related sub-
stances because it can be used to mask the presence of steroids.97 The
players were in violation of the Policy, after taking a dietary supple-
ment called StarCaps.98 In October 2008, the five NFL professional
football players were each suspended for four games, without pay, for
violation of the anti-doping rules.99 Pursuant to the terms of the Pol-
icy, which allowed players subject to disciplinary action to appeal to
an arbitrator, all five players appealed their suspensions, and their ap-
peals were consolidated. 100
B. Procedural History
On November 20, 2008, the arbitration hearing took place with Jef-
frey Pash, the Vice President and General Counsel of the NFL, pre-
siding as the hearing officer.101 Pash determined that the language of
the Policy required the suspensions of all the players to be upheld.'0 2
Subsequently, on December 3, 2008, Minnesota Vikings players Kevin
Williams and Pat Williams (the "Players"), filed suit against the NFL
in Minnesota Federal District Court, alleging numerous violations of
93. Id. at § 2 (blocking and masking agents, such as diuretics or water pills, are banned be-
cause they can mask the presence of steroids).
94. Id. at § 3(E).
95. Id. at § 6.
96. Id.
97. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2009).
98. Policy, supra note 92 at app. A(II)(A) (bumetanide is specifically banned under the Policy;
however, StarCaps was not explicitly banned under the policy).
99. Williams, 582 F.3d at 869.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 871.
102. Id. at 872.
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Minnesota common law. 103 Soon after, the Players amended their
complaint to assert a violation of Minnesota's Drug and Alcohol Test-
ing in the Workplace Act ("DATWA") and a violation of Minnesota's
Consumable Products Act ("CPA"). 10 4 Both Acts place restrictions
on employer's drug testing policies.10 5
The Players argued that the NFL testing procedure was unfair and
violated the players' rights and Minnesota employment laws.10 6 Using
the two-pronged analysis previously discussed in Bogan:10 7 that (1) a
state-law claim is preempted if it is based on a provision of the CBA,
meaning that the CBA provision at issue actually sets forth the right
upon which the claim is based,10 8 and (2) a state-law claim is pre-
empted where the claim is dependent upon an analysis of the relevant
CBA, meaning that the plaintiff's state-law claim requires interpreta-
tion of a provision of the CBA,10 9 the trial court held that the Players'
DATWA and CPA claims were not preempted, because the rights and
obligations under the state statutes existed independently of the CBA
and NFL Policy.1 10 The NFL appealed the district court's decision
that the Players' Minnesota statutory claims were not preempted by
Section 301, arguing that each claim could only be resolved by inter-
preting and applying the provisions of the NFL's CBA. 11
The DATWA imposes "minimum standards and requirements for
employee protection with regard to an employer's drug and alcohol
testing policies. 11 2 The DATWA expressly addresses CBAs, and
states that the Act "shall not be construed to limit the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement from bargaining and agreeing with re-
spect to a drug and alcohol testing policy that meets or exceeds, and
does not otherwise conflict with, the minimum standards and require-
ments for employee protection." 113 However, the DATWA applies to
all CBAs in effect after passage of the law in 1987.114
The Minnesota CPA generally prohibits employers from "dis-
ciplin[ing] or discharg[ing] an employee because the ... employee en-
gages in or has engaged in the use or enjoyment of lawful consumable
103. Id.
104. Williams, 582 F.3d at 872.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Williams, 582 F.3d at 873.
111. Id.
112. MINN. STAT. § 181.955 subdiv. 1 (2010).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 181.955 subdiv. 2.
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products, if the use or enjoyment takes place off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours. ' 115 The CPA defines lawful con-
sumable products as those that are consumed during use or enjoy-
ment, and includes food, alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages and
tobacco. '116 However, there are exceptions as to what an employer
may restrict. An employer can restrict employee consumption of
"lawful consumable products" if they "relate[ ] to a bona fide occupa-
tional requirement and [are] reasonably related to employment activi-
ties or responsibilities of a particular employee or group of
employees. 1' 17 Also, an employer can restrict lawful consumable
products if doing so is "necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with
any responsibilities owed by the employee to the employer.""n 8 This
is relevant because consumption of products such as the diuretic used
in Williams, arguably can be restricted by the NFL as the employer,
because doing so is necessary to avoid conflicts of interest between the
NFL and its players.
C. The Eighth Circuit's Opinion in Williams
i. DATWA Is Not Preempted by Section 301
The federal appellate court reasoned that to resolve the DATWA
claims, it only needed to compare an employer's actual testing proce-
dures with DATWA's requirements."19 By comparing the facts and
the procedure that the NFL actually followed with respect to its drug
testing of the Players with DATWA's requirements, the court was able
to resolve the Players' DATWA claim.120 Therefore, the court de-
cided it had no need to consult the Policy.121 This finding contributed
to the ultimate holding that the DATWA claim is not preempted by
Section 301.122
Moreover, the appellate court did not have to interpret the CBA in
order to determine if the NFL qualified as an employer under the
DATWA. Instead, the court only needed to reference certain provi-
sions of the CBA for mere consultation; interpretation was not re-
quired.' 23 The court quoted the Ninth Circuit in dismissing the NFL's
argument that denying preemption would render the uniform enforce-
115. MrNN. STAT. § 181.938 subdiv. 2 (2010).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 181.938 subdiv. 3(a)(1).
118. Id. § 181.938 subdiv. 3(a)(2).
119. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 876 (8th Cir. 2009).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 877.
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ment of its drug testing policy ineffective: "the terms of CBAs affect-
ing employees in multiple states should supersede inconsistent state
laws."'1 24 Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Lueck,125 where the Court reasoned that "Section
301 does not grant the parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract for
what is illegal under state law."'1 26 Consequently, the Court held that
the Players' DATWA claim was not dependent upon interpretation of
the CBA or Policy, and thus is not preempted by Section 301.127
ii. CPA Is Not Preempted by Section 301
Likewise, the federal appellate court held that Section 301 did not
preempt the Minnesota CPA claims. In doing so, it rejected the NFL's
arguments that (1) the court would have to interpret the Policy to de-
termine whether CPA defenses applied (e.g., that the bumetanide ban
was a bona fide occupational requirement or necessary to avoid con-
flicts) and whether the players' use had occurred away from work,
during non-working hours; and (2) the players had waived CPA rights
when the Union became a party to the Policy. 128
First, the appellate court found that defenses to state law liability
were irrelevant because the CPA claim on the merits was grounded in
state law, not the CBA, and thus it was not preempted. Second, it
rejected the NFL's claim that the CBA had to be interpreted, because
the CPA claim applied only to lawful substance use "off the premises
of the employer" and "during non-working hours."'1 29 As such, inter-
pretation of the CBA or Policy was unnecessary, because neither doc-
ument defined "off the premises of the employer" or "during non-
working hours" in relation to the time frame (during training camp) in
which the players tested positive. 130 Lastly, it rejected the NFL's
claim that the players waived their rights under the CPA. The court
reasoned that although state law rights that do not exist independently
of labor agreements can be waived, those rights that are created inde-
pendent of a CBA, such as though created by the CPA, may not be
124. See Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695 (9th Cir. 2001) (a large truck-
ing company made a similar argument to the NFL, and the 9th Circuit held that the LMRA did
not give employers and unions the power to displace any state regulatory law they found
inconvenient).
125. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1985).
126. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 695.
127. Williams, 582 F.3d at 878.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 880.
130. Id.
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waived.' 3 ' This holding presents a substantial obstacle for effective
anti-steroid and anti-doping testing in major sports leagues, and left
many, including the NFL, wary about the potential far-reaching
ramifications of this decision.
IV. ANALYSIS
In affirming the federal district court decision, the Eighth Circuit
erred in two distinct ways in Williams. 32 First, the Eighth Circuit
erred in holding that Section 301 did not preempt the DATWA and
CPA claims, because those claims can only be resolved by interpreting
and applying the provisions of the NFL's collectively bargained drug
testing program. This holding not only ignored congressional intent
and Supreme Court authority, but also severely handicapped the lati-
tude of permissible agreements that the NFL and Union may create in
the future with regards to its players. The implications of this holding
go far beyond determining who will be able to play defensive tackle
for the Minnesota Vikings. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Williams
that state statutory claims were not preempted by federal law has left
professional sports leagues with a patchwork of different state laws
and regulations, making it impossible to maintain a uniform drug use
policy across states. Second, the Eighth Circuit failed to respect the
arbitration decision. Arbitration procedures in respect to professional
sports must be respected due to their unique ability to provide a
timely and accurate resolution, and due to the arbitrator's superior
knowledge of industry standards. 133
A. Federal Preemption Was Warranted for the DATWA
and CPA Statutory Claims
Section 301 preemption should have been enforced in Williams with
respect to the players' DATWA and CPA claims, because those claims
challenge the lawfulness of a provision in the CBA and are substan-
tially dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the interpreta-
tion of the terms of such an agreement. Here, the DATWA and CPA
claims only exist by virtue of the Policy, which was the product of the
CBA between the NFL and the Union. Had the two parties never
entered into this CBA, there would never have been a drug test to
begin with, and, therefore, there would have been no basis for a claim.
131. Id.
132. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868.
133. Policy, supra note 92, § 10 (the Policy required the arbitrator to be the Commissioner or
his assignee. Further, the Policy stated that the arbitrator's decision constitutes a full, final, and
complete disposition of the appeal that is binding on all parties.).
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The DATWA claim is preempted because it mandates reference to
and analysis of the Policy. The DATWA states that "parties to a col-
lective bargaining agreement" can "bargain[ ] and agree[ ]" to a drug
testing policy as long as that policy "meets or exceeds, and does not
otherwise conflict with" DATWA's minimum standards. 134 Therefore,
in order for the Players to succeed on their DATWA claim, the court
would have to interpret certain terms of the CBA in determining
whether the CBA met or exceeded DATWA's threshold requirement
within the meaning of the Policy. 135 The Eighth Circuit in Williams
ignored this argument, and instead simply compared DATWA re-
quirements with the procedures that the NFL followed with respect to
its drug testing of the Players. 136 However, that is not what the
DATWA commands; the DATWA requires courts to analyze and in-
terpret the Policy and its requirements so it can meaningfully compare
them to the requirements of the DATWA. Thus, the Williams court
should have preempted the claim, because the DATWA claims are
"inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the [Pol-
icy].''137 The Eighth Circuit should have more closely examined the
plain language of the DATWA statute and understood it to mean that
the court must examine the CBA in its analysis.' 38
Further, the Players were essentially challenging the "very legality"
of a provision of the CBA.139 The basic thrust of the claims in Wil-
liams is the enforcement of the CBA itself, and - because there is no
doubt that the drug testing, review, and discipline procedures were
authorized by the terms of the Policy - the court should have deter-
mined that resolution of the DATWA claim obviously required an in-
134. MINN. STAT. § 181.955(1) (2010).
135. See Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
claims must be preempted that require interpretation of certain terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement).
136. Williams, 582 F.3d at 876.
137. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
138. See Zupanich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44504, at *8-9 (D. Minn. May
27, 2009) ("[Tlhe plain language of the statute requires the Court to examine the CBA to deter-
mine whether the agreement negotiated by the parties.., resulted in conditions that are more
favorable to the employees. As such, the claim is inextricably intertwined with the CBA."); see
also Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 910 (holding that the wrongful death suit was pre-
empted because the suit was intertwined with the CBA provisions regarding certification of team
trainers and responsibilities of team trainers and physicians).
139. See Medrano v. Excel Corp., 985 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1993) (where the claims are
essentially challenging the very legality of a provision of the CBA that had been faithfully ap-
plied and [that] was the basis for [the plaintiff's] termination, they will be preempted, because
the basic thrust of [plaintiff's] claim is that the enforcement of the CBA itself constitutes a tort
under state law, and resolution of that claim would obviously require an interpretation of the
CBA).
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terpretation of the CBA. If there was no collectively bargained drug
testing program, there would be no drug test, and there would be no
claim.
More importantly, the DATWA was not intended to apply to the
NFL Policy. The DATWA was designed to regulate testing for recrea-
tional drug use and abuse by employees in Minnesota. 140 Thus, even
if the suspensions were a technical violation of DATWA, they did not
violate the spirit of the law. The Minnesota Legislature was con-
cerned about the use and abuse of inebriating and addictive drugs by
employees; the Legislature was not concerned about the use of per-
formance-enhancing drugs by professional athletes in interdependent
sports leagues. 141 While the DATWA was designed to ensure that
drug testing in the workplace was not unnecessarily invasive, unfair,
or unreliable, the NFL Policy was designed to sustain and promote the
integrity of the game.
Likewise, Williams' CPA claim was precisely the type of state law
claim that should be preempted by Section 301. While the CPA bars
employers from "prohibiting the use or enjoyment of lawful consuma-
ble products off the premises of the employer during nonworking
hours," it excepts restrictions that "relate to a bona fide occupational
requirement and [are] reasonably related to employment activities or
responsibilities."'142 Thus, the court in Williams would have had to
look to the CBA in order to determine whether its anti-doping restric-
tions are related to a "bona fide" occupation qualification and em-
ployment activities. The court would have to look to the CBA to
identify the scope of NFL players' employment activities, and whether
those duties were requirements of the job. Therefore, the court
should have preempted the CPA claim. If the court held that the
claims were preempted, the arbitration decision would have been
given the appropriate deference, and the Policy that was specifically
bargained for by the NFL would have been enforced.
140. The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports' Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal CrossRoads:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. 7
(2009) (testimony of Gabriel A. Feldman, Associate Professor of Law and Director of Tulane
Sports Law Program, Tulane University School of Law) (arguing that the Williams decision
causes a problem that can be resolved without Congress creating an exemption).
141. Workplace drug laws appeared in the United States after the rate of drug abuse among
Americans climbed in the 1980s. See Deborah F. Crown & Joseph G. Rosse, A Critical Review
of the Assumptions Underlying Drug Testing, 3 J. Bus. AND PSYCHOL. 22 (1988). As a result of
the rapid growth of drug testing by private employers, several states, including Minnesota, en-
acted workplace drug regulations to protect employees. The legislature recognized that the em-
ployees had basic privacy rights that warranted protection. Id.
142. MIrNN. STAT. § 181.938(2) (2010).
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Again, the Minnesota legislature did not intend for the CPA to be
applied in the professional sports context. The CPA was enacted to
prevent employers from disciplining employees who used legal sub-
stances - in particular, alcohol or tobacco - away from company prop-
erty and during non-working hours. 143 It was clearly not intended to
limit the ability of professional sports leagues to test for the use of
steroids and should not have been interpreted as such.
i. The Enforcement of a Sport's Anti-Doping Rules Should Be
Uniform Across the Fifty States
The full impact of the Eighth Circuit's decision cannot be under-
stood without giving due consideration to the unique circumstances in
which professional sports leagues function. Although the decision is
troubling for all multi-state business organizations, the NFL is differ-
ent from most other organizations in the fact that the NFL teams do
not wish to drive each other out of business, but rather rely on compe-
tition among its cooperators - the other teams in the league. 144 This
decision significantly handicaps the latitude of permissible agreements
that the NFL and the Union may strike, creating a huge impediment
to a successful bargaining resolution between the NFL and its players.
By claiming the benefit of unique Minnesota statutes, the Players
from Minnesota received a judicial injunction to continue playing and
potentially override their suspension, while the New Orleans Saints
players remained suspended for use of the same substance. 145 This is
a perfect example of how the decision facilitates unjust and unfair re-
sults: players belong to the same union, playing under the same Policy,
and violating the same provision, are now playing under different
rules simply because they play in different states.
Minnesota's statutory protections make it more difficult to enforce
the NFL's anti-doping Policy against Vikings' players then against
143. See generally MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (2010); see also V. John Ella, What Do They Have in
Mind? Minnesota's Drug-Testing Law Turns 20, 64 BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 n.4 (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.mnbar.orgfbenchandbar/2007/sept07/drug-testing.htm.
144. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting player's
challenge on antitrust grounds to league's salary cap and college player draft, the court stated:
"Bargaining relationships [between professional athletes and their leagues] raise numerous
problems with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations. As a result, leagues and
player unions may reach seemingly unfamiliar or strange agreements. If courts were to intrude
and to outlaw such solicitations, leagues and their player unions would have to arrange their
affairs in a less efficient way.").
145. The New Orleans Saints players are waiting until the Minnesota players claims are re-
solved before serving their sentencing.
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players on other NFL teams.146 The decision in Williams leaves Min-
nesota sports teams with a competitive advantage over other teams
and corporations. The unique character of the rules governing nation-
wide athletic competition calls for and requires all states to look to
federal labor law when governing the interpretation and enforcement
of the Policy in order to prevent fragmentation of the NFL competi-
tive structure on the basis of state lines.147 Therefore, when dealing
with a drug testing policy that was adopted as part of a nationwide
CBA governing the interstate play of professional athletes, state law
must give way to the need for "interpretive uniformity and predict-
ability" that Section 301 is aimed at.148
Other states can now perhaps manipulate the decision in Williams
to possibly secure a competitive advantage for their respective home
teams. State legislatures could draft laws similar to Minnesota's CPA
in order to ensure that professional sports teams within its jurisdiction
will be allowed to take performance enhancing drugs without re-
course. International sports organizations, such as the Major League
Baseball ("MLB") and the National Basketball Association ("NBA"),
will now likely struggle to enforce a uniform set of rules in various
states, since laws in different states can now seemingly outlaw the abil-
ity of the league to maintain an equal playing field.
The three players from New Orleans, and the state of New Orleans
as a whole, have been treated unfairly. In response, it is possible that
the New Orleans state legislature could draft a new state law that
would override the NFL CBA. This law could conceivably be devised
to prohibit the player entry draft, negate the rookie wage scale, render
illegal any restraints on the trade of player contracts, or allow teams to
146. See Michael C. Dorf, Football and Federalism: A Case Centers on NFL Drug Testing,
FINDLAw (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090923.html.
147. Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 678 (Cal. 1983) ("Professional
football is a nationwide business structured essentially the same as baseball. Professional foot-
ball's teams are dependent on a league playing schedule for competitive play, just as in baseball.
The necessity of a nationwide league structure for the benefit of both teams and players for
effective competition is evident as is the need for a nationally uniform set of rules governing the
league structure. Fragmentation of the league structure on the basis of state lines would ad-
versely affect the success of the competitive business enterprise, and differing state antitrust
decisions if applied to the enterprise would likely compel all member teams to comply with the
laws of the strictest state.").
148. Trs. of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc.,
450 F.3d 324, 334 (8th Cir. 2006) (a trustee of multiemployer fringe benefit funds brought an
action against a company that specialized in caulking and waterproofing for a violation of a
statewide CBA. The defendants filed a third party complaint against the union for fraudulent
inducement. The court held that the third party claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresen-
tation were preempted under Section 301 of the LMRA, because in order to resolve the claim,
the court would need to perform a substantial independent analysis of the CBA.).
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break contracts to play games. Assume, for the sake of argument, that
New Orleans enacted a state workplace drug testing law that did not
permit an employee to be suspended from his job ever for a first of-
fense. The NFL, in turn, would have to adopt this same provision for
all of its players. NFL's General Counsel, in criticizing the Williams
decision, stated "there is nothing stopping any state from tomorrow
saying you have to give this person this many days before testing
them. If you're going to give them that amount of days notice, you
might as well hand them a 'you pass' card."'149
Not only does this decision create a patchwork of laws among
states, but it goes against congressional intent in drafting the LMRA.
Congress intended for Section 301 to preempt claims arising from
state laws like the DATWA and CPA. Congress enacted Section 301
precisely because of "[t]he possibility that individual contract terms
might have different meanings under state and federal law would in-
evitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements. '150 The Eighth Circuit com-
pletely ignores Congress' repeated attempts to establish uniformity on
the issue of performance enhancing steroid use in professional sports
leagues. The league-wide solution that Congress struggled for so
many years to find was finally achieved through the collective bargain-
ing process, 151 and Section 301 preemption is needed to protect this
process.
Further, in holding that the state statutory claims were not pre-
empted by Section 301, the Eighth Circuit directly contravened the
mandatory requirements of, and the public policy supporting, the
World Anti-Doping Code. As previously mentioned, the NFL CBA
and World Anti-Doping Code have striking similarities. A fundamen-
tal objective of all anti-doping programs is to maintain a level playing
149. Adolpho Birtch, NFL General Counsel, Keynote Speaker at DePaul University College
of Law (Nov. 16, 2009) (arguing that the Williams decision was wrongfully decided. The state
laws were not meant to apply to professional sports leagues. The decision is going to create
chaos, because potentially every state could be in conflict with the CBA in the future.).
150. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
151. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid Use,
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989). See also George W. Bush, Address
Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://fr
webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004-presidential-documents&docid=pd26
ja04-txt-10, ("Athletics play such an important role in our society, but unfortunately, some in
professional sports are not setting much of an example. The use of performance-enhancing
drugs like steroids in baseball, football, and other sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong
message.., so tonight I call on team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take
the lead, to send the right signal, and to get ride of steroids now.").
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field for the athletes;152 however, Williams makes fair competition im-
possible. The purpose of the Policy was to enforce a single, uniform
standard of player conduct to ensure an even playing field for all play-
ers. This is unjust to other states whose own statutes would not have
protected the players, and all the other players in the NFL who do not
use the substances. Moreover, allowing players who violate the drug
Policy to continue to play threatens the fairness and integrity of ath-
letic competition. The Eighth Circuit's misguided decision in Williams
to not extend Section 301 to the player's state statutory claims under-
mines the authority of NFL and employers alike and opens a danger-
ous door that could result in further litigation from national
employers who will now likely face an uphill battle to enforce its
CBAs with employees of different states.
ii. Effect of Williams on the Union: The Bigger Picture
The dangers posed by the Eighth Circuit's opinion stretch beyond
the context of professional sports leagues. By disallowing preemption
of the state statutory claims, the Williams court stripped employers of
their powers to bargain and negotiate with employees in a meaningful
way. This decision leaves multi-state employers vulnerable, with no
outlet to ensure its policies are uniformly enforced at all levels and
locations. Consider this hypothetical: a Chief Executive Officer of a
huge corporation has employees working in over thirty states. He has
to enforce the drug policy that was collectively negotiated with all the
employees of the corporation across state lines. During a routine drug
test, one employee in Illinois and another in Minnesota test positive
for a banned substance. Due to the decision in Williams, the CEO can
legally fire the employee in Illinois for cause in accordance to the con-
ditions of the company's CBA, but cannot fire the employee in Min-
nesota for the same offense. Now the Illinois employee who was fired
has suffered a blatant injustice since the employee in Minnesota - who
also violated the same policy - is still employed. The CEO would not
be able to effectively enforce his work policies in Illinois again be-
cause his authority has been undermined. The CEO's authority is in-
jured, because the CEO will not be able to enforce the terms that
were specifically agreed to.153 This is exactly the effect the Williams
decision will have on employers.
Undoubtedly, the NFL will have a hard time enforcing its drug Pol-
icy in many other states because of this new precedent issued by the
152. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 66, at art. 3.4.
153. This hypothetical assumes that the Company has a national Union and nationwide CBA,
and that Minnesota has a state law that prevents the firing of the employee for said conduct.
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Eighth Circuit. NFL players, regardless of what state they reside in,
now know that the two Vikings players were able to play despite the
two Players' violation of the Policy and their subsequent suspension.
After Williams, there are few, if any, affirmative acts an employer may
take in policy administration to assure federal preemption. Essen-
tially, CBAs will add little in the way of interpretation, and the negoti-
ated policies that an employer reaches with his employees are no
longer a safe harbor.154
Because uniformity in the interpretation of CBAs is vital to the fed-
eral scheme favoring collective bargaining, the Williams decision is a
hard hit for all employers. The holding will not stay confined to the
NFL and the two Minnesota Vikings Players; instead, it extends to all
employers who have grown accustomed to relying on the power of
negotiation to tailor CBAs with large groups of employees spread out
over several states. Employers are now mandated to consult every
state's workplace laws, along with all other potentially applicable stat-
utes, when negotiating their policies. This is an arduous task, which at
the end of the day leaves employers frustrated and stripped of their
once meaningful power to negotiate.
B. Uniform Enforcement of a Sport's Anti-Doping Policy Is Best
Served by Judicial Deference to Arbitration Decisions
Equally problematic is the Eighth Circuit's lack of judicial defer-
ence to arbitration decisions rendered under the NFL's Policy. Uni-
form administration of rules through a mandatory arbitration process,
just like uniformity of the rules themselves, creates a level playing
field for all teams and athletes. 155 Consequently, uniform enforce-
ment of sport's anti-doping rules is best served by judicial deference
for arbitration decisions.
The NFL Policy provides its own specialized adjudication system to
resolve confirmed positive test results. "Players subject to disciplinary
action may appeal to an arbitrator, who is either the Commissioner or
his designee," and whose decision "constitute[s] a full, final, and com-
plete disposition of the appeal" that is "binding on all parties."'1 56
154. See Dale Deitchler, United States: Minnesota Law Applies to Union-Negotiated Drug
Testing Policies, Says Eighth Circuit, LITTLER BLOGS (Sept. 2009), http://www.littler.com/Press-
Publications/Lists/ASAPs/DispAsaps.aspx?id=1431&asapType=National.
155. See World-Anti-Doping Code, supra note 66, and the USADA Protocol. Both require a
single arbitral body to be the final decision-maker in Olympic Movement anti-doping cases.
Under the World-Anti-Doping Code, decisions by an arbitrator shall be final, binding on the
parties, and not subject to further review. The CAS process is well adapted to efficient and
timely resolution of anti-doping disputes.
156. Policy, supra note 92, § 10.
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There is no question that in negotiating the Policy, the NFL intended
for disputes to be handled through arbitration. Arbitration is espe-
cially valuable in the context of sports, mainly due to the availability
of a timely resolution, the ability of parties to rely on the finality of
the decision, and the arbitrator's specialized knowledge of league
rules and customs. Further, as previously mentioned, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly guided courts to respect and defer to arbitration
decisions.1 57
In Williams, Jeffrey Pash, the Executive Vice President and General
Counsel of the NFL was the hearing officer for the appeal at the arbi-
tration.158 Pash was better suited to deal with the suspension of the
Players than the Eighth Circuit because of his extensive legal experi-
ence in the professional sports context 159 and his knowledge of the
customs, practices, and traditions of professional sports leagues. The
NFL is a unique creature, and Pash had expertise with the industry
and the language of the CBA. His decision to uphold the suspensions
was far more informed than that of a court who deals with the issue at
arms length. Thus, the court in Williams should have respected and
deferred to Pash's initial decision.
V. IMPACT
The Eighth Circuit's decision could have disastrous ramifications
for the NFL and other professional sports leagues, specifically in re-
gard to the interplay between state statutory drug testing laws and the
league's testing policies for performance-enhancing drugs. Currently,
five states have mandatory drug regulation statutes that directly con-
flict with the NFL Policy. 160 However, every state that is home to at
least one professional sports franchise restricts workplace drug testing
in some way, making it possible for the Williams decision to have a
far-reaching effect.' 61 Further, the risk remains that a state might en-
157. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
158. Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 871 (8th Cir. 2009).
159. Women's Campaign Forum, http://www.wcfonline.org/sites/wcf/index.php/event/bio/
dinner_13/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (Pash worked for a D.C. Law firm Covington & Burling,
which worked on the NFL account. Later, Pash signed on with the NHL, where he served four
years as general counsel. In 1996, Pash started working for the NFL, where he has been ever
since.).
160. These states are Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, and North Carolina. See
Feldman, supra note 140, at 14.
161. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-330 (1995), ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.600 (2007), ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23-493.04(A) (2000), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 557-31-51(w) (2003), HAWAII REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 329B 4-5 (2007), IDAHO CODE § 72-1702(1) (2005), 127 ILL. COMP. STAT. 580/5 (2010),
IOWA CODE § 730.5(2) (2006), MAINE REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-683(3) (1995), Miss. CODE § 71-7-3
(2004), MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-207 (2009), NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1903 (2000), N.C. GEN.
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act a new statute or modify an existing statute that would conflict with
the NFL Policy. Thus, the Williams decision is unhealthy for the
NFL's drug testing Policy as a whole. With each Policy violation, it
will be necessary under Williams to get the states' interpretations of
their respective labor laws and allow each player to make an excuse
for why a banned substance was found by drug test.
In light of this decision, the NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell,
went before Congress on Nov. 3, 2009, and lobbied for legislation that
would exclude CBAs from state law challenges.162 The use of state
law to block suspensions "illustrates with compelling force the need
for legislation here."'1 63 Representative Henry A. Waxman, the Chair-
man of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, said the Wil-
liams decision "could render the NFL and Major League Baseball
drug testing programs unenforceable, loophole-ridden and unaccept-
ably weak and ineffective." 164 While Goodell's proposition was met
by supporters as well as critics, it still remains to be seen whether Con-
gress will pass an amendment to avoid future suits similar to the one
in Williams.
Not only does this decision undermine the integrity of sports and
strip employers of their effective power to negotiate with employees,
but it downplays the importance of arbitration in the union atmos-
phere. The decision leaves all employers who have negotiated a CBA
wondering how effective having an arbitration clause in the agreement
really is, evincing the need for all courts to give judicial deference to
arbitrators decisions. It is no surprise that the NFL was displeased
with the ruling of the Eighth Circuit, and it requested that the entire
Eighth Circuit hear the case.165 The MLB, NBA, and the National
Hockey League ("NHL") all filed briefs supporting the NFL, arguing
that the court's decision affected each organization's ability to enforce
its own rules prohibiting use of athlete steroids and other perform-
ance-enhancing drugs.166 However, in a split decision in December
STAT. § 95-232 (2006), OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 40-551 (1993), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1 (2003),
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-107-50 (2009), TENN. CODE § 50-9-105 (2001), UTAH CODE § 34-38-5
(2001), 21 V.S.A. § 513 (1987).
162. Goodell to seek labor law amendment in wake of Williams Case, CBS SPORTS, Nov. 2,
2009, at 1, available at http://www.cbssports.comlnfl/story/12461657.
163. Id.
164. Goodell Meets Support, Critics in Congress over Drug Programs, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 3,
2009, at 1, available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d813ec617&template=with-
video-with-comments&confirm=true.
165. Steve Kamowski, Appeals court declines to rehear Williamses case, STAR TRmUNE, Dec.
14, 2009, at 1, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/sports/appeals-court-declines-rehear-
williamses-case.
166. Id.
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2009, the Eighth Circuit denied the NFL's request for a full panel re-
hearing; four of the court's eleven judges dissented. 167
The extent of the problem has not been fully revealed, as the NFL
recently filed an appeal of the Williams decision to the Supreme
Court. 168 The NFL argues in its brief to the Supreme Court that "The
Eighth Circuit's erroneous pre-emption decision thus has turned fed-
eral labor law from a uniform and stable framework for labor-man-
agement relations into a legal Catch-22 in which employers are
literally liable if they do comply with the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and liable if they do not."'1 69 Some have speculated that be-
cause the preemptive scope of labor law is judge-made, it is possible
that the Supreme Court will hear the case and expand the scope of
Section 301 preemption. 70 In May 2010, the Minnesota state court
ruled in the NFL's favor in the Williams case. After a two-month-long
trial,171 the court held that the Players were not harmed by the NFL's
violation of the state workplace laws and thus the state laws did not
prevent the NFL from suspending the Players. 172 The Players still
have yet to serve their suspension. 73 While this was a small victory
for the NFL, the league still remains the ultimate loser. Since the Wil-
liams case began, the NFL has been seeking a determination that the
NFL's drug policies trump state law, so that players cannot resort to
state laws to challenge drug suspensions. The NFL did not get that
from the Minnesota state ruling. The fact of the matter remains that
167. Id.
168. NFL files appeal of StarCaps case to Supreme Court, CBS SPORTS, May 13, 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/13387307/nfl-files-appeal-of-starcaps-case-to-supreme-
court/rss.
169. Id.
170. Standen, supra note 62, at 5.
171. Judge allows Vikings' players Starcaps suit vs. NFL to go to trial, USA TODAY, Feb. 18,
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/footballnfl/vikings/2010-02-18-wiliams-star
caps-suitN.htm (Judge Gary Larson, a Minnesota state court judge, in response to both parties'
motions for summary judgment, ruled on February 18, 2010, that the case will go to trial March
8, 2010. His 44-page opinion reiterated the Eighth Circuit's holding that NFL drug policies do
not trump state law, and held that the DATWA and the CPA apply to professional sports
leagues. Judge Larson held that the NFL may have violated the DATWA confidentiality provi-
sion, and also by failing to inform the Players of their positive test results within three days of the
test. However, he rejected the Players CPA claims. Further, Judge Larson specifically rejected
the notion that the NFL had a special need to maintain a uniform policy: "[D]espite varying state
laws, corporations that participate in employee drug testing conduct business across state lines
everyday in this country. Defendants failed to demonstrate why it would be more onerous for
the NFL to comply with state laws, than for any other business engaged in interstate
commerce.").
172. Mark Maske, Judge Rules in NFL's favor in 'StarCaps' case, THE WASHINGTON POST,
May 6, 2010, available at http://views.washingtonpost.com/theleague/nflnewsfeed/2010/05/udge-
rules-in-nfls-favor-in-starcaps-case.html.
173. Id.
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the Players were still able to bring their state law claims against the
NFL, even though they ultimately lost on those claims. The state
court decision does not change the fact that state law claims are not
preempted by the NFL CBA. Now, the NFL must wait to hear if the
Supreme Court will hear the case. Regardless of whether or not the
Supreme Court grants Certiorari, the NFL will need a solution in or-
der to prevent similar situations from happening in the future.174
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A solution to this preemption problem, while necessary, seems far
off. The simplest solution would be for the NFL to seek a statutory
exemption from the Minnesota State Legislature to prevent a similar
situation from arising in the future. This solution, however, is pre-
mised on a Minnesota state court concluding that the suspensions
were in fact a violation of the Minnesota laws. 175 In the Williams case,
the Minnesota state court found that the suspensions were not a viola-
tion of the Minnesota laws. However, if another state court ever
holds that similar suspensions violated state law, the NFL would be
able to appeal to the state legislature and argue that the Minnesota
laws were not intended to apply to the drug-testing of professional
athletes. The Minnesota legislature could then carve out an exception
in the laws that states the laws do not apply to collectively bargained
performance enhancing drug testing policies of professional sports
leagues.
The NFL could also bargain for the next CBA with state laws in
mind. In future agreements, the NFL could draft its Policy to meet or
exceed the most protective state standards. However, this solution
poses a problem; among the twenty-two states that currently have an
NFL franchise, state law varies widely and is constantly changing.
Consequently, the NFL Policy would have to be continuously
amended every time state legislatures changed respective state law in
order to meet or exceed it. It appears nearly impossible to have a
drug testing policy that would be able to comply with not only twenty-
two current state laws, but also as twenty-two states' potentially appli-
cable state laws. This solution also does not take into account that
states are not seemingly considering the NFL's needs when drafting
these laws. As it stands, several state laws punish violators of drug
policies in the workplace with prolonged sanctions. For example,
the DATWA gives first-time violators the right to go to rehabilita-
174. Id.
175. Id.
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tion.176 Due to the nature of the NFL - with seasons that are short
and players who do not have a large window of time they are able to
play in the NFL - punishment by rehabilitation would not fit the par-
ticular needs of the NFL.
The NFL has another option when drafting future CBAs. The NFL
and the Union could amend the current policy to require not only
arbitration proceedings for violations of its own policies, as the CBA
in Williams did, but also require mandatory arbitration for all state
claims related to drug testing. As previously discussed, courts have
long favored arbitration agreements in CBAs involving professional
sports, 177 and the addition of a clause providing mandatory arbitration
for state claims would further ensure judicial deference to the arbitra-
tion system. Waiving the right to judicial forum is not a waiver of the
substantive right itself; a player would still be allowed to bring his
claim in arbitration, and if he believes he has a claim under state law,
the Union would have the discretion to file a grievance on his be-
half.178 In a recent Supreme Court case, the Court allowed a union to
waive its statutory right to a judicial forum in age discrimination
claims. 179 In the wake of this decision, it appears that the Union could
waive its right to the judicial forum in a future CBA, and demand that
everything is handled through the arbitration process.
Finally, Congress could listen to Commissioner Goodell and pass
federal legislation 180 that protects the collectively bargained for per-
formance-enhancing drug policies of professional sports leagues. This
amendment would most likely be narrowly drawn to avoid unintended
results. Congress would have to balance the interest of allowing pro-
fessional sports leagues to be free from interference by state work-
place anti-drug laws with the danger of allowing the employers to
176. MINN. STAT. § 181.938 subdiv. 2 (2010).
177. See generally Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Er-
ving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Kansas City Royals
v. MLB Players Ass'n, 532 F. 2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
178. Unions are under a duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
179. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (employees alleged that their employer and
the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated
against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union,
Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advi-
sory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which the employer and 14 Penn Plaza are
members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination
claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union's grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. The issue in this case was whether a union has the power to bargain away its members'
rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The Supreme Court held that a union could
waive a statutory right to a judicial forum in age discrimination claims).
180. Karnowski, supra note 165, at 1.
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have free reign to change their policy to whatever they may choose.
For example, the new policy could permit the NFL to suspend a player
without a confirmation test or without providing a hearing. In order
to prevent states from interfering with the CBAs of professional
sports leagues, while at the same time ensuring that the policies have
minimum protections of players in place, the federal legislation must
be narrowly drawn.
In September 2010, Senator Byron Dorgan introduced the "Clean
Sports Protection Act," ("Bill") which would allow drug-testing pro-
grams to preempt state law, but only if those drug-testing programs
are more likely to detect performance-enhancing drugs.181 This Bill is
the federal legislature's direct response to the Williams case. The leg-
islation is limited because it only applies to the steroids policy and not
the substance-abuse policy.182 This approach "allow[s] the NFL to
erase the StarCaps loophole without requiring the NFLPA to agree to
do so via collective bargaining." 183 If enacted, the Bill would prevent
a repeat of the Williams situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Williams did not hinder the Minne-
sota Vikings and New Orleans Saints from having successful seasons,
but it has left employers and professional sports leagues questioning
both the power of negotiated CBAs with employees and the enforce-
ment of those CBAs' policies. Now, employers and professional
sports leagues are limited to testing procedures and remedies that are
permitted by the state law. This frustrates the power of bargaining
and the competitive balance that is needed in the context of profes-
sional sports. Had the Eighth Circuit in Williams either given judicial
deference to the arbitrator's decision to suspend the players or pre-
empted the claims under Section 301, the NFL would not be in the
troubling situation of being subject to inconsistent state laws. Because
of the ramifications of the decision, the Eighth Circuit's holding
should be reversed by the Supreme Court. If NFL policies applied, it
would give deference to the bargaining process, the CBA resulting
from that process, and, ultimately, the arbitrator's decision.
181. Clean Sports Protection Act, S. 3851, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong-bills&docid=f:s3851is.txt.pdf (the Bill has
been referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
182. Id.
183. Greg Rosenthal, Senate bill introduced to prevent another StarCaps case, NBC SPORTS,
Sept. 28, 2010, http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/09/28/senate-bill-introduced-to-prevent-
another-starcaps-case/.
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